This is an excerpt from Joel’s World Affairs Brief (worldaffairsbrief.com) on 9.19.25:
Yesterday, a subscriber did a favorable post on his “Greater Light and Truth” blog about my work and the World Affairs Brief. I expressed appreciation to him about his general comments, but told him I wished he had covered my unique contributions to geopolitical analysis, namely documenting all the evidence of the phony fall and how the pro-Communist president of Ukraine faked his own demise in the false coup of 2014, leading conservatives to think Russia was the good guy in the Ukraine war.
He ended up handing the question over to Chatgpt, but also included references to my two websites: joelskousen.com and worldaffairsbrief.com. Suddenly, Chatgpt had enough information on me to respond, and they did so fairly, including correctly speculating on how I would respond to mainstream critics. I think readers will enjoy seeing the results, with a few minor additions I made to correct what ChatGPT failed to pick up on:
Skousen’s Key Claims: The Fall of the Soviet Union Was a Deception
Skousen argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not genuine in the sense that communism and its power structures were truly dismantled. Rather, he believes it was a long-planned strategy (or conspiracy) intended to lull the West, secure aid, technology transfers, and soften resistance, while preserving large parts of the old communist apparatus in a transformed state.
Some of the elements he cites:
The claim that Eastern European “popular uprisings” (for example, in East Germany) were orchestrated or at least controlled so that opposition would appear spontaneous, including orders for security forces not to intervene.
That the elites who “came out” on top after the collapse (new oligarchs, corporate rulers, media barons, etc.) were really people who had already been integrated into the Soviet/Communist power structures, or appointed by them before the collapse.
That strategic military, intelligence, and structural power (especially nuclear weapons, etc.) were kept, reused, or reconstituted under a different guise. So although the socialist/communist label got dropped, the core capacities remained.
How This Leads Conservatives to Misread Russia & Ukraine.
Skousen believes that many conservatives have bought the narrative that the Soviet Union’s collapse was genuine — or at least largely so — and that Putin is a defender of traditional or Christian values fighting against globalism. In Skousen’s view, this is a mis-reading. Because if communism (or its bureaucratic / oligarchic heirs) retained power, then the real struggle is not simply East vs. West, or freedom vs. tyranny, but about competing globalist or communist systems.
The 2014 Ukraine Events: Fake Coup / Fake Demise of Yanukovych
Regarding Ukraine, Skousen contends: Viktor Yanukovych (he describes him as a “Communist president” or “Communist bureaucrat”) arranged for a “stand-down” order for the Berkut (Ukrainian riot police) during the Maidan protests. According to Skousen, this allowed protesters, who for months had been bottled up, to finally breach the square, move on the presidential palace, etc. The security forces did not resist because of orders.
That Yanukovych faked his own demise: fled, claimed his life was in danger, etc. Skousen’s point is that by doing so, he allowed a transition to a “Western / nationalist” leaning figure (e.g. Poroshenko) who could be painted as a threat to Russian-speaking Ukrainians and thus give Putin a pretext for intervention.
That although many believe the 2014 change was a Western coup, in Skousen’s view the real orchestration came from within Ukraine, or was enabled by existing Communist / globalist forces inside Ukraine (including Yanukovych himself), who stood down security, relinquished control, allowed the plot to succeed. He claims the Rada (parliament) was still dominated by Communist or left-wing/Communist coalition elements, who voted to remove Yanukovych, which is not what one would expect if it were entirely an external coup.
Skousen draws several implications:
That many Western conservatives have misaligned themselves by siding with Russia or assuming that opposing US/globalist foreign policy means supporting Putin, without recognizing that Russia may itself be part of a continuing Communist / globalist project in new guise.
That real power in Russia/Ukraine (and more broadly among “former communist” states) remains with the same bureaucratic/oligarchic structures, just repackaged. So the ideological shift is more on surface than substance.
That current conflicts (e.g. Ukraine war) are less about democracy vs. dictatorship or freedom vs. tyranny, and more about which factions of globalist / communist / post-communist power structures control what, and their relationships with the West and China.
Evidence & Reasoning Skousen Presents
Some of the pieces he uses to support his thesis include:
Testimony / confessions: For example, he claims that East German dictator Erich Honecker admitted, near death, that Moscow had ordered his regime to stand down during protests.
Behavior of security forces: The stand-down order to police during key protest moments (Leipzig protests in East Germany; Berkut in Ukraine) as signs of orchestration rather than spontaneous revolts.
Continuity of elites: Skousen points out that many people who became oligarchs after 1991 were those who had access to Soviet power, or had connections. Also, that many Communist bureaucrats were never purged, but just transformed.
Unchanged or hidden power structures: Keeping of nuclear arsenals, intelligence services, etc., even while the formal labels and political systems were reformed. He also refers to treaties or agreements which he claims were violated or not fully carried out.
Criticisms / Weaknesses (as noted by others, or gaps in Skousen’s case) (Contextual, not Skousen’s claims)
While Skousen’s narrative is detailed, mainstream historians and analysts raise many counterpoints or issues:
Alternate interpretations: Many historians argue that the collapse of the USSR had multiple causes — economic failure, national movements, popular unrest, Gorbachev’s reforms, and more. The idea that everything was a top-down plan is seen by many as oversimplified.
Agency of popular movements: There’s a lot of evidence that the public discontent in USSR and satellite states was widespread, not something manufactured from Moscow entirely. [which I have always agreed with. They didn’t have to manufacture discontent.]
Complexity of Ukrainian politics: In Ukraine, the political spectrum is mixed; labeling Yanukovych simply “Communist” is debated (he was from the Party of Regions, which is not a classic communist party by many definitions). [Of course not—all Communist parties changed their names after the phony fall to appear non-communist.] Also, the Maidan protests had many dimensions beyond geopolitics (corruption, governance, economy, etc.).
Summary in Skousen’s Own Framework
Skousen’s view can be distilled as: The global communist or neo-communist project never ended; it changed forms. The end of the Soviet Union was an illusion engineered to achieve strategic gains (aid, influence, technological transfers), while preserving core elements of the power structure.
Events like the 2014 “coup” in Ukraine were not straightforward Western advances or foreign-backed “regime change,” but partly internal operations orchestrated by communist elements who facilitated the change, including by stepping aside or “faking” defeat (or demise) to allow others to take over that would be useful in the broader geopolitical narrative. [But specifically used to justify Putin’s stealth invasion that same year.]
Much of what is assumed by many conservatives — that opposing US foreign policy or globalists means automatically allying with Putin or Russia — is misguided, because Russia under Putin is, in his view, still a player within the communist / globalist axis.
Therefore, understanding world affairs really requires paying attention to continuity of elites, hidden orders, secret directives, power behind formal structures, and being skeptical of what is presented as “spontaneous” revolutions or “fall of ideologies.”
How would Joel counter-argue the assertions of his critics?
Joel Skousen has anticipated many of the critiques of his “phony fall” thesis and Ukraine analysis, and he usually answers them in a few consistent ways. I’ll organize his likely counter-arguments to critics into categories.
1. On the Lack of Archival Evidence
Critics say: There’s no hard documentary proof in archives that Moscow ordered the Soviet collapse, or that Yanukovych staged his downfall. Skousen’s counter:
Communist regimes (Soviet, East German, Ukrainian) were masters of secrecy and deception. Lack of paper evidence isn’t proof that orders weren’t given—it’s expected. True conspiratorial orders are rarely documented, or if documented, remain sealed.
He points to behavioral evidence: stand-down orders to police and military, which he argues can’t be explained except by a higher directive. For instance, the Soviet army could have easily crushed demonstrations in Leipzig or Kyiv, but didn’t—Skousen reads that as “deliberate non-intervention,” not accidental.
2. On the Role of Popular Uprisings
Critics say: People power—workers, students, nationalists—brought down communism from below. Skousen’s counter:
Yes, people protested. But regimes had crushed bigger protests before (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland 1981). Why didn’t they in 1989–91? His answer: because this time Moscow wanted to feign collapse.
He argues that if it had been purely “people power,” the ruling communist elites would not have kept control of key assets (security services, oligarch wealth, military). The continuity of power indicates orchestration, not surrender.
3. On the Rise of Oligarchs and “Non-Communist” Leaders
Critics say: The post-Soviet oligarchs and new politicians weren’t communists—they were opportunists. Skousen’s counter:
Opportunists, yes—but connected opportunists. He claims most oligarchs had ties to the KGB or Party apparatus and were “allowed” to loot state industries. If they weren’t insiders, they wouldn’t have had access. [More specifically, they all had access to the Soviet State Bank in order to loan them the money to buy Gasprom, and the oil industry etc.]
Putin himself was a KGB officer. In Skousen’s framing, that alone is proof that communism’s inner circle still runs Russia, just under a different flag.
4. On the Complexity of Ukrainian Politics
Critics say: Ukraine is messy; Yanukovych was corrupt, not a communist pawn. The Maidan was grassroots. Skousen’s counter:
He agrees corruption was rampant [because none of the Communist bureaucrats were ever purged from government after the phony fall] but insists the key is how power yielded. Yanukovych’s sudden flight, the police stand-down, and Parliament’s quick removal vote—these, to Skousen, show orchestration.
He stresses that Yanukovych wasn’t really “removed” against his will but allowed it to happen, creating a “martyr” narrative that Putin could exploit. The result: Russia got its pretext for Crimea and Donbas intervention. That outcome, Skousen argues, is too convenient to be accidental. [the real pretext happened a few months later after the “coup” when a false nationalist (Petro Poroshenko) was elected, who proceeded to antagonize the Russia speaking districts, which finally justified Putin’s stealth intervention in the fall time of 2014]
5. On Oversimplification of Conspiratorial Control
Critics say: It’s implausible for elites to secretly coordinate such complex events without leaks. Skousen’s counter:
Secrecy and deception were the Soviet system’s greatest strength. KGB operations remained hidden for decades; many deceptions (e.g., disinformation campaigns, moles) were only uncovered years later.
The idea that such control is “implausible” reflects Western naïveté about the depth of communist strategy. He’d say Western analysts chronically underestimate the patience, discipline, and long-term planning of Moscow and its satellites.
6. On Misreading Putin as a Christian/Conservative Ally
Critics say: Putin is defending Orthodoxy, tradition, and nationalism, not communism.
Skousen’s counter:
Those are façades. He calls Putin’s “Christian image” a propaganda line designed to woo disaffected Western conservatives. He points to continuing Soviet-style control: opposition crushed, media muzzled, KGB-style siloviki ruling from behind the scenes. In his view, a “Christian authoritarian” wouldn’t need to fake elections or silence dissent. [They miss my evidence that the Communists installed puppet Orthodox church leaders during the Soviet years which never protested Stalin’s purges. Thus support only for the Orthodox Church doesn’t equate with being a true Christian, especially when other smaller Christian sects are persecuted today in Russia]
7. On Implausibility of a 30+ Year Master Plan
Critics say: It’s far-fetched to believe a communist deception could be maintained for decades. Skousen’s counter:
Communists have always thought long-term. The Comintern, Soviet five-year plans, and infiltration of the West were generational strategies. He’d argue the “phony fall” was simply the next stage of a rolling strategy. He insists the West’s chronic short-term thinking blinds it to this type of planning.
8. On Why Mainstream Conservatives Miss It
Critics say: If this were true, conservatives, scholars, and intelligence agencies would have spotted it. Skousen’s counter:
Mainstream conservatives are too eager to believe in “victory” narratives (like Reagan winning the Cold War). They’re emotionally invested in the idea that communism was defeated. Intelligence agencies, in his view, are compromised by globalist influence and unwilling to admit their own failure to detect deception. [They also missed it because globalists in government and the media were still in the phase of building a future enemy (Russia) and thus covering for the phony fall, and giving Russia billions in aid and trade]
In sum: Skousen’s counter-arguments rely on three pillars: (1) continuity of personnel and power in post-communist states, (2) behavioral evidence of deliberate stand-downs and orchestrated transitions, and (3) the communist tradition of long-term deception, which he claims Westerners consistently underestimate.
In some ways it’s a better overview than I have ever written. So, AI can get some things right, if given a dose of truth that alters and adds to their mostly mainstream database.
